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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge
This is our second encounter with this case, which 
again requires us to consider the enforcement of an 
administrative subpoena issued by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) seeking to compel 
Kronos Incorporated (“Kronos”), a non-party to the 
underlying action, to disclose information about its 
employment tests.  The EEOC issued the disputed subpoena 
as part of its investigation into an allegation that Kroger 
grocery store violated the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, 
. 
et seq.
 
, by failing to hire a 
disabled applicant after she took an employment test created 
by Kronos.  We previously held that the EEOC was entitled 
to Kronos’s data without the geographic, temporal, and 
topical restrictions originally imposed by the District Court 
except insofar as the EEOC sought discovery regarding racial 
discrimination.  We also remanded for the District Court to 
conduct a good cause balancing test to determine if a 
confidentiality order was warranted. 
On remand, the District Court expanded the scope of 
its original order, but again placed certain limitations on the 
disclosure of information related to the Kronos tests.    
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Regarding Kronos’s request for a confidentiality order, the 
court found there was good cause to enter a modified version 
of the order we previously reviewed.  Finally, the District 
Court required Kronos and the EEOC to split evenly the costs 
of production.   
 
Although the District Court’s thoughtful handling of 
this case reflects its efforts to comply with our mandate and to 
strike a balance between the burden on a non-party and  the 
EEOC’s need for information, we must reverse and remand 
for the reasons that follow.  We note, however, that we agree 
with much of the District Court’s discussion regarding the 
need for a confidentiality order, and our remand on this issue 
is solely for the purpose of allowing the District Court to 
consider how the specific limitations it ordered are tied to 
Kronos’s justifiable fears regarding the disclosure of 
proprietary information.  Similarly, we are reversing the 
District Court’s cost-sharing order not because we necessarily 
disagree with the result, but to allow the court to make an 
individualized determination of whether the costs of 
production under the newly expanded subpoena are outside 
the scope of what Kronos can reasonably expect to bear as the 
cost of doing business.   
 
I. 
 
The underlying facts of this case relate to a charge of 
discrimination Vicky Sandy filed with the EEOC on June 30, 
2007.  Sandy, who is hearing and speech impaired, applied to 
work as a cashier, bagger, and stocker at a Kroger grocery 
store in West Virginia.  As part of the application process, 
Sandy took a Customer Service Assessment (the 
“Assessment”) created by Kronos and received a low score of 
40%.  Kroger admitted it relied, at least in part, on the 
Assessment when it decided not to hire Sandy. 
 
A. 
 
During the course of its investigation into Kroger’s 
hiring practices, on March 11, 2008, the EEOC issued a third-
party administrative subpoena to Kronos.  The subpoena 
initially sought documents solely related to Kroger, including 
any validity studies related to the Assessment.  The EEOC 
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later expanded the scope of the subpoena to include the 
nationwide use of Kronos’s assessment tests and the tests’ 
impact on both minority and disabled applicants (like the 
District Court, we refer to the modified subpoena as 
“Subpoena 2”).  Specifically, Subpoena 2 directed Kronos to: 
 
1. Produce any and all documents and data 
constituting or related to validation studies or 
validation evidence pertaining to Unicru [a 
Kronos subsidiary] and/or Kronos assessment 
tests purchased by The Kroger Company, 
including but not limited to such studies or 
evidence as they relate to the use of the tests as 
personnel selection or screening instruments. 
 
2. Produce the user’s manual and instructions 
for the use of the Assessment Tests used by The 
Kroger Company[.] 
 
3. Produce any and all documents and data, 
including but not limited to correspondence, 
notes, and data files, relating to the Kroger 
Company; its use of the Assessment Tests; 
results, ratings, or scores of individual test-
takers; and any validation efforts made thereto. 
 
4. Produce any and all documents discussing, 
analyzing or measuring potential adverse 
impact on individuals with disabilities and/or an 
individual[’]s race. 
 
5. Produce any and all documents related to any 
and all job analyses created or drafted by any 
person or entity relating to any and all positions 
at The Kroger Company. 
 
6. Furnish a catalogue which includes each and 
every assessment offered by Unicru/Kronos. 
Additionally provide descriptions of each 
assessment. 
 
EEOC v. Kronos Inc., 620 F.3d 287, 294 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“Kronos I”). 
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Kronos objected and filed a Petition to Revoke the 
Subpoena with the EEOC.  Kronos claimed that the 
information sought by the EEOC included data that was 
irrelevant to Sandy’s charge and that much of the information 
sought by the EEOC constituted valuable trade secrets that 
would be at risk of further disclosure if revealed.  The EEOC 
denied the petition and, after Kronos failed to provide the 
requested information, filed a motion to enforce the subpoena 
in district court.   
 
The District Court granted the motion in part, but 
limited the scope of the subpoena to documents related to 
Kroger’s West Virginia operations and the positions of 
cashier, bagger, and stocker, from January 1, 2006 to May 31, 
2007.  The District Court also refused to allow discovery 
related to racial discrimination, since it was not a part of 
Sandy’s charge.  In sum, the District Court ordered Kronos to 
do the following: 
 
1.  Produce any user’s manual and instructions 
for the use of the Assessment Tests provided to 
the Kroger Company. 
 
2.  Produce any and all documents and data, 
including but not limited to correspondence, 
notes, and data files, relating to The Kroger 
Company; The Kroger Company’s use of the 
Assessment Tests; results, ratings, or scores of 
individual test-takers at The Kroger Company; 
and any validation efforts performed 
specific[ally] for and only for The Kroger 
Company. 
 
3.  Produce any and all documents discussing, 
analyzing or measuring potential adverse 
impact on individuals with disabilities, relating 
specifically to and only to the Kroger Company. 
 
4.  Produce any and all documents related to 
any and all job analyses created or drafted by 
Kronos relating to the bagger, stocker, and/or 
cashier/checker positions at The Kroger 
Company. 
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5.  Furnish any catalogue provided to The 
Kroger Company. 
 
6.  Items 1 through 5 are limited to the time 
period of January 1, 2006 through May 31, 
2007, in the state of West Virginia, for the 
positions of bagger, stocker, and/or 
cashier/checker. 
 
Id.
 
 at 295.  At Kronos’s urging, the District Court also entered 
a confidentiality order confining the EEOC’s use of discovery 
materials obtained from Kronos.  The EEOC appealed the 
District Court’s decision to us.   
B. 
 
In Kronos I
 
, we reversed the District Court’s 
geographic and temporal restrictions, as well as the 
restrictions related to job description, and affirmed the 
District Court’s refusal to allow discovery into racial 
discrimination.  We also vacated the confidentiality order and 
remanded so that the District Court could conduct the proper 
good cause balancing test, noting that the District Court 
should keep in mind the requirements of the Federal Records 
Disposal Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3314.  Since the exact language of 
our opinion is important for determining whether the District 
Court complied with our mandate, a detailed discussion of 
that opinion is necessary. 
Kronos I required us to consider the scope of the 
EEOC’s investigatory power.  As we explained, “The EEOC 
is empowered to investigate charges of discrimination to 
determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that an 
employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice.”  
Id. at 296.  This power is not without limits.  Instead, “the 
EEOC is entitled to access only evidence ‘relevant to the 
charge under investigation.’”  Id.
 
 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
8(a)).  We went on to explain: 
The relevance requirement is not particularly 
onerous.  Courts have given broad construction 
to the term relevant and have traditionally 
allowed the EEOC access to any material that 
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might cast light on the allegations against the 
employer.  Nonetheless, the EEOC’s power of 
investigation is anchored to the charge of 
discrimination, and courts must be careful not to 
construe the charge and relevance requirements 
so broadly as to confer unconstrained 
investigative authority upon the EEOC.  The 
relevance requirement is designed to cabin the 
EEOC’s authority and prevent fishing 
expeditions.  The EEOC bears the burden of 
demonstrating relevance.  
 
Id. at 296-97 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  We 
further explained that the concept of “relevance” may change 
during the course of an EEOC investigation, as the EEOC is 
permitted to pursue leads that arise during the course of an 
investigation even when that new evidence reveals “a broader 
picture of discrimination” than the original charge.  Id.
 
 at 297 
(quotation marks omitted). 
 In examining what constituted relevant evidence for 
Sandy’s charge, we noted that the ADA prohibits 
employment tests of the type Kronos makes (and Kroger used 
in its hiring decisions) when such tests “‘screen out or tend to 
screen out’” disabled people and the use of the test is not 
“‘job-related for the position in question’” and “‘consistent 
with business necessity.’”  Id. at 296 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
12112(b)(6)).  Tests of this type may be impermissible under 
both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories.  Id.   
Thus, evidence that would “cast light on” either a claim for 
disparate treatment or disparate impact caused by the use of 
the Kronos assessments would be relevant.  
 
Id. 
 The EEOC argued that all job types, geographic areas, 
and time periods were relevant, as well as all “Kronos 
Assessment instructions and manuals . . . (regardless of 
whether Kronos actually provided them to Kroger), [and] 
materials related to validation studies and potential adverse 
impact based on disability, even if such materials are not 
specific to Kroger’s use of the test.”  Id. at 297.  We agreed, 
holding that the District Court had employed “too restrictive a 
standard of relevance in limiting the information related to 
geography, time, and job position.”  Id.  Moreover, we held, 
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“the District Court erred in limiting the EEOC’s access to 
user’s manuals and instructions, validation information, and 
materials pertaining to potential adverse impact on 
individuals with disabilities.”  Id.  We determined that such 
information would aid the EEOC by providing “useful 
context and important comparative data” for its investigation 
of Kroger’s use of the Assessment.  Id.
 
 at 298 (quotation 
marks omitted).   
We rejected Kronos’s assertion that Subpoena 2 sought 
“information or materials related to assessment tests Kroger 
has never purchased and has never used,” and instead held 
that the materials sought by the EEOC in Subpoena 2 were 
“not so broad as to render the relevance requirement a 
‘nullity.’”  Id. at 299 (quoting EEOC v. Shell Oil, 466 U.S. 
54, 69 (1984)).  Specifically, we held that “[t]he District 
Court’s decision denying the EEOC access to particular 
materials unless they relate only to Kroger was an improper 
use of its discretion” because any information in Kronos’s 
possession regarding whether the Assessment had an adverse 
impact on disabled people, or the validity of the Assessment, 
“certainly might shed light on the charge of discrimination.”  
Id.
 
  We further rejected Kronos’s argument that Sandy’s 
charge failed to allege disparate impact, thereby confirming 
that evidence related to any disparate impact of the 
Assessment on disabled people would be relevant to the 
EEOC’s investigation.  We summarized our holding on these 
issues as follows: 
[W]e will reverse the District Court’s judgment 
insofar as it limited the scope of the EEOC’s 
subpoena in terms of geography, time, and job 
description.  We will also reverse to the extent 
that the District Court’s order limits the 
EEOC’s access to validation efforts conducted 
solely on behalf of Kroger, documents relating 
to potential adverse impact on disabled 
individuals to those relating specifically and 
only to Kroger, and user’s manuals and 
instructions for the Assessment that were 
actually provided to Kroger. 
 
Id. at 300. 
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 Next, we considered the EEOC’s request for 
documents related to any adverse impact that the Assessment 
had on the basis of race.  We held that such a request was 
improper in light of the fact that Sandy’s charge of 
discrimination related solely to disabilities.  In so holding, we 
stated that “the inquiry into potential race discrimination is 
not a reasonable expansion of Sandy’s charge” but instead 
constitutes “an impermissible fishing expedition.”  Id.
 
 at 301 
(quotation marks omitted). 
 Finally, we considered the propriety of the 
confidentiality order entered by the District Court.1  We 
began by recognizing that “[c]ourts have ‘inherent equitable 
power’ to grant orders of confidentiality upon a showing of 
good cause” by the party seeking the order.  Id. at 301–02 
(quoting Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 785–
86 (3d Cir. 1994)).  We remanded this matter to the District 
Court for it to conduct the “good cause balancing test” we 
established in Pansy
 
, 23 F.3d at 788, which requires a court to 
consider certain factors before issuing a confidentiality order. 
 Although we did not weigh the Pansy factors 
ourselves, we did clarify the principles of law that the District 
Court should consider on remand in light of the fact that the 
information at stake here was requested by a government 
entity.  Specifically, we stated that the good cause balancing 
test operates under “a strong presumption against entering an 
order of confidentiality whose scope would prevent disclosure 
of information that would otherwise be accessible under a 
relevant freedom of information law.”2
 
  620 F.3d at 302.  We 
further cautioned that: 
the District Court should be mindful of the 
                                              
1 It is important to note that the EEOC did not object to, or 
stipulated to, the following parts of the confidentiality order:  
(1) the prohibition on disclosure of “subpoenaed material to 
Sandy or her agents during the investigation”; and (2) the 
limitation on disclosure of subpoenaed material to anyone 
outside the EEOC, including expert witnesses, unless agreed 
upon in writing.  Id. at 303 n.8. 
2 The relevant disclosure law here is the federal Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, et seq. 
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statutory scheme governing disposal of 
government records. The Federal Records 
Disposal Act (“FRDA”) prohibits destruction of 
government records except according to its 
requirements.  44 U.S.C. § 3314.  The FRDA 
defines “records” as “documentary materials . . . 
made or received by an agency of the United 
States Government under Federal law or in 
connection with the transaction of public 
business and preserved or appropriate for 
preservation . . . as evidence of the organization, 
function, policies, decisions, procedures, 
operations, or other activities of the 
Government.”  44 U.S.C. § 3301.  Courts must 
exercise caution when issuing confidentiality 
orders so as not to demand that the EEOC 
destroy government documents, including notes 
and memoranda, in conflict with the EEOC’s 
duty to obey the requirements of the FRDA. 
 
Id.
 
 at 303–04 (parenthetical omitted).  With those caveats, we 
remanded this matter to the District Court. 
C. 
 
On remand, the District Court invited the parties to 
submit proposed orders that would comply with our mandate.  
The EEOC’s proposal differed from both Subpoena 2 and the 
District Court’s modified version thereof, seeking, inter alia, 
Kronos data related to all of its customers (not just Kroger) 
and personal data belonging to test-takers.3  EEOC v. Kronos 
Inc., No. 09-mc-0079, 2011 WL 1085677 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 
2011) (hereinafter “Kronos II”).  The District Court instead 
elected to enforce Subpoena 2 with new modifications that it 
believed conformed to our decision in Kronos I.  Id.
                                              
3  The District Court found that the parties’ first two proposed 
orders were too vague and asked both parties to modify their 
first proposed orders to be more specific regarding exactly 
what type of information was at issue.  The EEOC asserts that 
its proposed order was sent pursuant to the District Court’s 
instructions for specificity and did not represent a broadening 
of Subpoena 2.  The District Court disagreed. 
 at *14.  
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The EEOC sought reconsideration, which the District Court 
partially granted, altering the text of its order but retaining 
much of the language challenged by the EEOC.  Specifically, 
as modified by its reconsideration order of May 3, 2011,4
 
 the 
District Court:  
• Modified the request in ¶ 1 for “any and 
all documents and data constituting or 
related to validation studies or validation 
evidence pertaining to Unicru and/or 
Kronos assessment tests purchased by 
The Kroger Company, including but not 
limited to such studies or evidence as 
they relate to the use of the tests as 
personnel selection or screening 
instruments” by adding that such studies 
or evidence must be produced, “even if 
created or performed for other 
customer(s), if such studies or evidence 
were relied upon in creating or 
implementing the test for Kroger.”  This 
provision also stated that “[t]he 
names/identity of any other customer(s) 
should be deleted/redacted.
• Altered ¶ 3, which requires Kronos to 
produce “any and all documents (if any) 
related to the Kroger Company, 
including but not limited to 
correspondence, notes and data files, 
relating to The Kroger Company; its use 
of Assessment Tests; results, ratings, or 
scores of individual test-takers; and any 
validation efforts made thereto,” by 
”  The court 
further provided that “[s]aid document 
production is limited to information 
relating to disabilities, persons with 
disabilities, or adverse impact upon 
persons with disabilities.”   
 
                                              
4 The language added following reconsideration of the 
District Court’s original order enforcing the subpoena is 
underlined. 
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adding the disability-related limitation in 
¶ 1. 
 
• Added ¶ 6, which forbids the EEOC 
from disclosing documents or 
information produced under the 
Subpoena — all of which it termed 
“Confidential Information”5 — to anyone 
else, including Sandy, and that any 
EEOC person who saw the information 
must agree in writing to the terms of the 
Order.  The District Court also limited 
the use of the “Confidential Information” 
to the Sandy Charge.  Finally, the Court 
placed the burden on the EEOC to file a 
motion to challenge whether a document 
should be marked confidential by adding 
the following:  “Once document 
production occurs pursuant to this Order 
of Court, should the EEOC believe that 
good cause exists to lift the ‘Confidential 
Information’ designation for any 
particular document(s), the EEOC may 
file a motion in that regard, and the 
Court will conduct the proper inquiry
• Added ¶ 8, which states:  “If any party or 
third party seeks to obtain Confidential 
Information from the EEOC under either 
the [Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”)] or Section 83 of the EEOC 
Compliance Manual while the EEOC’s 
investigation of the Sandy Charge is 
open, then the EEOC will notify Kronos 
. . . as soon as is practicable and will 
assert that the Confidential Information 
is exempt from disclosure under FOIA, 
based on the pending investigation, 
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1610.10 and/or 
.” 
 
                                              
5  The court defined “confidential information” as “any 
documents or information derived from documents produced 
pursuant to” its order enforcing the subpoena. 
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the EEOC’s own rules or procedures.  If 
a FOIA request or any other request for 
the contents of the file with respect to the 
Sandy Charge or Confidential 
Information is received after [the] EEOC 
has closed the Sandy Charge, the EEOC 
agrees to notify Kronos in the same 
manner as described and as soon as is 
practicable, but in no event more than 
five (5) business days after the request is 
received, and the EEOC agrees to give 
Kronos an opportunity to object to 
disclosure of the Confidential 
Information to the requesting party.  
Kronos shall have five (5) business days 
after receiving such notice to object to 
disclosure.  If Kronos objects, [the] 
EEOC agrees not to disclose the 
Confidential Information to the 
requesting party or parties.  [The] EEOC 
further agrees that, if a party sues [the] 
EEOC under FOIA to obtain a copy of a 
charge file which includes Confidential 
Information, [the] EEOC will not object 
to Kronos intervening to pursue its 
objections and confidentiality concerns.” 
 
• Added ¶ 9, which provides, “No use 
shall be made of personal information 
regarding any Kroger employee, 
applicant, and/or test taker without prior 
permission of this Court.” 
 
See Appendix (“App.”) 43–49.6
 
 
                                              
6 The District Court also added ¶ 7 to set forth a procedure for 
disclosing Confidential Information to outside experts and  ¶¶ 
10 and 11 to state that neither party waived its objections 
regarding the confidentiality issues and that the court would 
retain jurisdiction to enforce its order.  The EEOC does not 
object to these provisions. 
14 
 
In crafting these provisions, the District Court 
performed the Pansy balancing analysis that we required in 
Kronos I, finding that the privacy interests of job applicants, 
the need to protect Kronos’s trade secrets, and the fact that 
the information was not “critical to public health or safety” all 
counseled in favor of granting the confidentiality order.  
Kronos II, 2011 WL 1085677, at *15.  On the other side of 
the scale was the fact that the information was sought for a 
legitimate purpose, information-sharing would promote 
“efficiency and fairness,” and the public interest.  Id.  The 
District Court ultimately found that these factors weighed in 
favor of granting a limited confidentiality order (which, 
unlike the previous order, allowed the entry of data into a 
centralized database and did not require the destruction of 
documents within ten days).  Id.
 
 at *16. 
The District Court also entered a cost-sharing order, 
finding that it was proper to require the EEOC to reimburse a 
subpoena recipient for the cost of production under our 
decision in United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 
1976).  Kronos estimated that the cost of compliance with the 
modified subpoena would be $75,000, although it seems to 
have provided no evidence to support this figure.7  App. 50.  
Following briefing by both parties, the District Court decided 
that requiring each party to pay 50% of the costs would 
properly “strike a balance between the EEOC’s need for the 
information, and the financial burden on Kronos.”  Id.
                                              
7 The only evidence in the record relating to costs was the 
affidavit of Annette Kuhn, Kronos’s Director of Workforce 
Science Services, and the exhibits appended thereto.  Kuhn 
reviewed the original, broader version of Subpoena 2, and 
averred that Kronos had more than 11 million responsive 
documents which would cost somewhere between $656,184 
and $1,161,119 to produce.  App. 87, 91.  The Kuhn affidavit 
does break down costs on an hourly basis and would have 
been available to the District Court, but because the District 
Court does not refer to these materials in its opinion, it is 
unclear whether it considered them when adopting Kronos’s 
$75,000 figure. 
 53.  
The EEOC contends this was an error both on the merits and 
because Kronos waived this issue by not raising it to the 
District Court in the first proceedings. 
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II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 
161(2) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1345.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a 
district court’s decision to grant or deny a subpoena 
enforcement application for an abuse of discretion.  Kronos I, 
620 F.3d at 295.  It is an abuse of discretion for a district 
court to base its decision on “a clearly erroneous finding of 
fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of 
law to fact.”  Id. at 295–96 (quotation marks omitted).  “We 
also employ an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing 
the grant of a confidentiality order.”  Id.
 
 at 295. 
III. 
The EEOC first challenges the District Court’s 
revisions of the subpoena on the basis that they conflict with 
our mandate in Kronos I
 
 and that they are otherwise 
inappropriate on the merits. 
“It is axiomatic that on remand for further proceedings 
after [a] decision by an appellate court, the trial court must 
proceed in accordance with the mandate and the law of the 
case as established on appeal.”  Bankers Trust Co. v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 949 (3d Cir. 1985).  “A 
trial court must implement both the letter and spirit of the 
mandate, taking into account the appellate court’s opinion and 
the circumstances it embraces.”  Id.  When an appellate court 
does not issue specific instructions on how to proceed, “the 
question as to what further proceedings can be had consistent 
with the opinion of the appellate court must be determined 
from the nature of the case and the pertinent statutory 
provisions.”  Id. at 950.  During the course of such 
proceedings, the district court “may consider, as a matter of 
first impression, those issues not expressly or implicitly 
disposed of by the appellate decision.”  Id.
 
   
As we recently explained in United States v. Kennedy, 
682 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 2012), the requirement that a district 
court comply in full with our mandate has several important 
purposes: 
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It preserves the proper allocation of authority 
within the tiered federal court structure set up 
by Congress and the Constitution.  It promotes 
predictability and finality by notifying parties of 
the matters that remain open on remand and 
committing the rest to final resolution.  And it 
safeguards stability in the administration of 
justice, for the orderly functioning of the 
judiciary would no doubt crumble if trial judges 
were free to disregard appellate rulings.  See 
Litman v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 825 F.2d 
1506, 1511-12 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Post mandate 
maneuvering in the district courts would 
undermine the authority of appellate courts and 
create a great deal of uncertainty in the judicial 
process.”); cf. Hutto v. Davis
 
, 454 U.S. 370, 
375 (1982) (“[U]nless we wish anarchy to 
prevail within the federal judicial system, a 
precedent of this Court must be followed by the 
lower federal courts no matter how misguided 
the judges of those courts may think it to be.”). 
Id.
 
 at 253 (some citations omitted). 
We must therefore “examine whether the District 
Court adhered to the mandate in our first opinion or whether 
it ventured beyond its authority.”  Id.
 
   
A. 
 
The EEOC argues that the District Court erred by 
modifying its request for “any and all documents and data 
constituting or related to validation studies or validation 
evidence pertaining to Unicru and/or Kronos assessment tests 
purchased by The Kroger Company, including but not limited 
to such studies or evidence as they relate to the use of the 
tests as personnel selection or screening instruments,” by 
adding that such studies or evidence must be produced, even 
if done for another company, only if they were “relied upon 
in creating or implementing the test for Kroger.”  App. 48.  
 
As we noted in Kronos I, to enforce an administrative 
subpoena, the EEOC must demonstrate:  “(1) its investigation 
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has a legitimate purpose, (2) the inquiry is relevant to that 
purpose, (3) the agency does not already possess the 
information requested, (4) the agency has complied with 
relevant administrative requirements, and (5) the demand is 
not unreasonably broad or burdensome.”  620 F.3d at 296 n.4 
(quotation marks omitted).  Here, as before, it is the second 
requirement that is at issue.   
 
Because the concept of “relevance” in the context of 
an administrative subpoena enforcement action was 
thoroughly explained in Kronos I, a detailed discussion is 
unnecessary.  It suffices to reiterate that this requirement is 
“broad” and not “particularly onerous” but must nonetheless 
be “anchored to the charge of discrimination.”  Kronos I, 620 
F.3d at 296–97.  It is also worth noting that the first decision 
to remand this matter was based on our opinion that the 
District Court “applied too restrictive a standard of relevance” 
in creating its original geographic, temporal, and topical 
limitations.  Id. at 297.  Specifically, we held that “[t]he 
District Court’s decision denying the EEOC access to 
particular materials unless they relate only to Kroger was an 
improper use of its discretion” because documents unrelated 
to Kroger could nonetheless “shed light on the charge of 
discrimination.”  Id.
 
 at 299 (emphasis added). 
 The District Court’s decision to restrict the scope of 
the subpoena to validation studies or evidence that Kronos 
“relied upon” in crafting the assessment used by Kroger 
impermissibly contradicts our holding in Kronos I that such 
documents must be produced by Kronos even if they are not 
directly linked to Kroger.  In Kronos I, we considered (and 
rejected) the District Court’s decision to limit “production of 
‘documents discussing, analyzing, or measuring potential 
adverse impact on individuals with disabilities’ to those 
‘relating specifically to and only to The Kroger Company.’”  
Id.  We explained that such documents are relevant even if 
not directly connected to Kroger because they could reveal 
that the assessment had an adverse impact on disabled 
applicants or they could “assist the EEOC in evaluating 
whether Kroger’s use of the test constituted an unlawful 
employment action.”  Id.  The District Court nonetheless 
introduced the “relied upon” language on remand, which is 
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only marginally broader than the “relating specifically to” 
language we rejected.8
 
   
To prove a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6), the 
EEOC is required to show that the employment test at issue 
(1) “screen[s] out or tend[s] to screen out” disabled 
applicants; (2) is unrelated to the position sought by the 
applicant; and (3) is not “consistent with business necessity.”  
These statutory requirements place the nature and efficacy of 
the test (or tests)9
 
 at issue, at least insofar as the test was 
purchased by Kroger — a proper limitation already included 
in Subpoena 2.  It was therefore unnecessary to include the 
“relied upon” clause, since the question of whether these tests 
were given in violation of the ADA forces courts to look 
objectively at how the tests work.    
Any limitation on the production of validity studies 
that requires such studies to relate to Kroger in any way 
impermissibly excludes relevant evidence and violates our 
mandate in Kronos I
 
.  We will therefore remand with 
instructions to the District Court to remove the “relied upon” 
language from its order enforcing the subpoena. 
B. 
 We now turn to the District Court’s alteration of ¶¶ 1 
and 3 by adding language intended to limit the applicability 
of the subpoena to disability-related issues.  Paragraph 1 
                                              
8 Arguably, this language is actually narrower because it 
limits the way in which the information must relate to Kroger.  
Conversely, the removal of “specifically” and the addition of 
the proviso that studies done for other companies must be 
produced if they were “relied upon” could be viewed as 
making the newer language slightly more expansive.  
Whether the District Court’s most recent modification is 
slightly narrower or broader, however, is immaterial because 
the language is not sufficiently different to satisfy the 
requirements of our mandate. 
9  It is unclear from the record whether Kroger purchased 
multiple tests from Kronos, but if discovery reveals that it 
did, then information surrounding each of the purchased tests 
would be relevant. 
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sought validation studies and evidence regarding the Kronos 
assessments, and ¶ 3 sought the production of “any and all 
documents (if any) related to the Kroger Company, including 
but not limited to correspondence, notes and data files, 
relating to the Kroger Company; its use of Assessment Tests; 
results, ratings, or scores of individual test-takers; and any 
validation efforts made thereto.”  App. 43–44.  In both 
instances, the District Court added the following language:  
“[s]aid document production is limited to information relating 
to disabilities, persons with disabilities, or adverse impact 
upon persons with disabilities.”  Id.
 
 at 44. 
 Regarding the validation studies sought in ¶ 1, it is 
again worth looking at our statement in Kronos I
 
 that “the 
District Court erred in limiting the EEOC’s access to user’s 
manuals and instructions, validation information, and 
materials pertaining to potential adverse impact on 
individuals with disabilities.”  620 F.3d at 297.  There are two 
possible interpretations of this language:  either the 
“pertaining to . . . disabilities” clause modifies only 
“materials,” or the clause also modifies “user’s manuals and 
instructions” and “validation information.”  We believe it is 
relatively clear that we intended the former meaning, as it 
would be illogical to require that the “user’s manuals and 
instructions” pertain to disabilities.  Thus, there is no basis in 
our prior opinion for limiting “validation information” to that 
which relates to disabilities; our opinion only limits such 
information if it pertains to the wholly unrelated field of 
racial discrimination. 
 Again, it is insufficient for the EEOC to show simply 
that an employment test screens out disabled applicants.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).  The EEOC must also prove that the 
test does not relate to the position at issue and is not 
“consistent with business necessity.”  Id.  It is thus a proper 
inquiry for the EEOC to seek information about how these 
tests work, including information about the types of 
characteristics they screen out and how those characteristics 
relate to the applicant’s ability to fulfill his or her duties for 
the prospective position.  The EEOC must also consider how 
these tests work at screening out those unable to perform a 
certain job and “screening in” those who can.  The type of 
information sought in ¶ 1 is relevant to this inquiry and 
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should be provided in order for the EEOC to effectively 
pursue its investigation.  
 
 Kronos responds that the EEOC’s Uniform Guidelines 
on Employee Selection Procedure, which sets forth standards 
for test validation when an adverse impact on a protected 
class has been shown, specifically does not apply to disabled 
persons.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2(D).  For this reason, Kronos 
asserts, there is no requirement that a company administering 
an employment test conduct validation studies related to an 
adverse impact on disabled persons.  We agree that no such 
requirement exists, but this argument misses the point — the 
question is not whether Kronos or Kroger was required to 
conduct a validation study targeted towards a specific group, 
but whether any validation studies (targeted or otherwise) that 
Kronos has already conducted are relevant to Sandy’s charge 
of discrimination.  Moreover, it appears that the validity 
studies in Kronos’s possession are of general applicability 
and were not specifically targeted to race and gender.  At oral 
argument, counsel for Kronos conceded that “it varies, but 
generally speaking validity studies to show whether or not a 
test is job-related are not directed specifically at a race or a 
gender or a national origin.”  Oral Arg. at 24:41–24:59.  We 
then asked counsel whether these studies focused on the 
people taking the test or the test itself, to which counsel 
responded that validation studies “relate to whether or not the 
test predicts performance on a particular job” and admitted 
that “to the extent that [the EEOC] wish[es] to see if the test 
predicts job performance generally, [the validation study] is 
relevant.”  Id.
 
 at 33:56–34:43.   
 We also disagree with the inclusion of the disability 
limitation in ¶ 3.  All of the information in ¶ 3 is already 
sufficiently limited because it relates to The Kroger Company 
and is, again, generally necessary to help the EEOC 
understand whether Kroger’s use of the assessment was 
permissible and to prove the elements of § 12112(b)(6).  
There is no reason why communication between Kroger and 
Kronos regarding the Assessment (or any other tests Kroger 
purchased) should be excluded simply because it does not 
directly relate to disabilities. 
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 We note that there is the potential for some of the 
information sought in both ¶¶ 1 and 3 to include documents 
related to race.  In our view, this is not inherently problematic 
so long as the requests do not specifically target documents 
related to race.10  If the documents produced by Kronos in 
response to the subpoena reveal that there was a racially 
related impact on hiring, then, as we noted in Kronos I
 
, the 
EEOC need not ignore this new evidence.  620 F.3d at 301.  
In such a case, the EEOC could file a commissioner’s charge 
alleging racial discrimination pursuant to its power under 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b) and 2000e-6. 
 For these reasons, on remand we instruct the District 
Court to remove the language in ¶¶ 1 and 3 that limits the 
evidence sought in those paragraphs to disability-related 
issues. 
 
IV. 
 
 We now consider the confidentiality order entered by 
the District Court.  As noted, in Kronos I we reversed the 
District Court’s grant of this order based on the failure to 
consider the “good cause balancing test” we established in 
Pansy
 
, which encompasses the following, non-exhaustive list 
of factors: 
1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy 
interests; 
 
2) whether the information is being sought for a 
legitimate purpose or an improper purpose; 
                                              
10 In recognition of the District Court’s valid concern that the 
evidence sought in the subpoena could allow the EEOC to 
venture impermissibly into the field of racial discrimination, 
the EEOC stipulated that it had no objection to the District 
Court’s allowing Kronos “to redact the information that 
relates solely, and refers specifically and only to, race, and to 
redact the names of Kronos’s other clients.”  Oral Arg. 
44:14–38.  The District Court may wish to consider adding 
the EEOC’s proposed limiting language to allow for the 
redaction of client names and to preclude the production of 
documents that relate solely to race. 
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3) whether disclosure of the information will 
cause a party embarrassment; 
 
4) whether confidentiality is being sought over 
information important to public health and 
safety; 
 
5) whether the sharing of information among 
litigants will promote fairness and efficiency; 
 
6) whether a party benefitting from the order of 
confidentiality is a public entity or official; and 
 
7) whether the case involves issues important to 
the public. 
 
620 F.3d at 302. 
 
On remand, the District Court properly set forth the 
Pansy factors and explained how each factor should be 
weighed in this case.  The court found that the privacy 
interests of job applicants, the need to protect Kronos’s trade 
secrets, and the fact that the information was not “critical to 
public health or safety” all counseled in favor of granting the 
confidentiality order.  Kronos II, 2011 WL 1085677, at *15.  
The “most compelling factor” in the District Court’s view 
was “that the privacy interests of Kronos would be protected 
and their trade secrets and/or proprietary information would 
be kept ‘confidential’” if an order was issued.  Id.  This was 
important, the court said, because if Kronos’s assessment 
materials were to be publicly disclosed, “the potential harm 
and damage to the business of non-party Kronos would be 
significant.”  Id.
 
    
The District Court then considered the factors that 
weighed against granting a confidentiality order.  On this side 
of the scale was the fact that the information was sought for a 
legitimate purpose, that information-sharing would promote 
“efficiency and fairness,” and the public interest.  Id.
 
  The 
District Court ultimately found that these factors weighed in 
favor of granting a limited confidentiality order, stating: 
[A]fter further consideration, the Court has 
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revised the prior Confidentiality Order 
hopefully consistent with the direction of the 
Court of Appeals and has substantially limited 
the terms of the Confidentiality Order to 
address the concerns of the parties.  Notably, 
the Court has removed from its Order the 
provisions that the confidential material not be 
entered into a centralized database, and that the 
notes or memoranda made by the EEOC shall 
be destroyed within ten (10) days after a notice 
of right to sue is issued by EEOC.  The Court in 
general has used the language suggested by the 
EEOC with additional safeguards suggested by 
Respondent in light of the trade secret 
information of Respondent and personal data of 
the test takers. 
Id.
 
 at *16 (citation omitted).   
The District Court effectuated its confidentiality order 
by adding five new paragraphs to its general order of March 
21, 2011, three of which are disputed here (¶¶ 6, 8, and 9).  
Paragraph 6 contained the provision that the EEOC could not 
disclose documents or information produced under the 
Subpoena — all of which it termed “Confidential 
Information” — to anyone else, including Sandy,11
 
 and that 
any EEOC employee who saw the information must agree in 
writing to the terms of the Order.  This paragraph also limited 
the use of the Confidential Information to the Sandy charge.  
To the extent that the EEOC wished to challenge whether a 
document should be designated confidential, the court 
required it to file a motion. 
 Paragraph 8 reflected Kronos’s concerns about 
whether its information would be disclosed via FOIA requests 
to the EEOC.  The provision states that the EEOC must assert 
an exemption and notify Kronos if a FOIA request is received 
during the pendency of the Sandy charge.  If such a request is 
                                              
11  The EEOC does not dispute that this information should be 
withheld from Sandy and has stipulated that it will not “make 
any disclosure to Sandy or her agents during the 
investigation.”  EEOC Br. 38. 
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received after the charge has been closed, the EEOC is 
prohibited from disclosing the information should Kronos file 
a timely objection.  Further, ¶ 8 provides that the EEOC 
cannot object to Kronos’s intervention in any suit in which a 
party seeks to obtain Confidential Information from the 
EEOC. 
 
Paragraph 9 states, “No use shall be made of personal 
information regarding any Kroger employee, applicant, 
and/or test taker without prior permission of this Court.”  
App. 45.  This paragraph does not explain what constitutes 
“personal information.” 
 
A. 
 
The EEOC first argues that no confidentiality order is 
warranted because the information it seeks is protected from 
disclosure by Title VII and the ADA, both of which prohibit 
any EEOC employee from making charges public or 
revealing any information acquired pursuant to an 
investigation before a formal proceeding is instituted.  42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-8(e), 12117(a).  For example, § 2000e-8(e) 
provides, “It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of 
the [EEOC] to make public in any manner whatever any 
information obtained by the [EEOC] . . . prior to the 
institution of any proceeding . . . involving such information.”  
The EEOC also points out that the Trade Secrets Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1905, forbids the EEOC and its employees from 
disclosing trade secrets or other confidential commercial 
information.  Additionally, the EEOC asserts that the Privacy 
Act of 1974 protects EEOC files from disclosure both during 
and after an investigation.  See
 
 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b), 552a(b); 
29 C.F.R. § 1610.19(a).  Finally, although the EEOC may be 
empowered to make certain disclosures to the parties to a 
charge during the course of an investigation, it has stipulated 
that it would not disclose any subpoenaed material to Sandy 
or her agents during the course of its investigation.  EEOC Br. 
35–36. 
Kronos responds by emphasizing the harm that any 
disclosure — whether accidental or intentional — would 
cause to its business.  Any breach in confidentiality of this 
material would render the tests useless for Kronos’s clients 
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and could advantage a competing test developer.  Kronos 
would then be forced to devote a considerable amount of time 
and resources to developing new assessments, which could 
harm its ability to operate a profitable business.  Kronos also 
expresses concern about the release of individual test takers’ 
private information and its contractual obligations to maintain 
confidentiality in its customer communications. 
 
In light of Kronos’s valid fear regarding the harm it 
could suffer from disclosure of the subpoenaed information, 
some form of a confidentiality order may indeed be warranted 
in this case.  Confidentiality orders have been approved in 
other cases where district courts ordered the disclosure of 
testing materials because the courts recognized the 
importance of maintaining the confidentiality of such 
documents.12  See, e.g., EEOC v. Aon Consulting, Inc., 149 
F. Supp. 2d 601, 609 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (holding a 
confidentiality order was warranted because “the EEOC has 
not shown that existing statutory and regulatory procedures 
and protections offer sufficient protection to require 
disclosure”); EEOC v. C&P Tel. Co.
                                              
12 The EEOC urges us to overturn the confidentiality order 
based on University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 
(1990), which held that a university does not enjoy a special 
privilege “against disclosure of peer review materials” related 
to discrimination charges.  Id. at 184.  As Kronos correctly 
points out, this case and the other cases cited by EEOC are 
not on point.  Kronos Br. 45–46 & n.25.  While the Court 
mentioned the statutory non-disclosure provisions in the 
EEOC laws and suggested that the privilege would impede 
the effective administration of the statute, it did not in any 
way suggest that a district court must refuse to grant 
additional confidentiality protections where otherwise 
warranted due to the non-disclosure laws governing the 
EEOC. 
, 813 F. Supp. 874, 876 
(D.D.C. 1993) (finding that the “extremely strong interest in 
protecting the subpoenaed information,” which related to 
employment tests, justified the entry of a confidentiality 
order).  The EEOC argues that the lack of necessity due to the 
existing statutory protections renders a confidentiality order 
improper, but we see no abuse of discretion in the District 
Court’s conclusion that additional protection was needed 
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because the business interests of Kronos — a third party to 
this litigation — would be greatly harmed if its proprietary 
data was disclosed.  Moreover, since the EEOC has asserted 
that various statutes otherwise protect this data from 
disclosure, it is difficult to see how the EEOC’s interests, or 
the public interest in disclosure, is affected by a 
confidentiality order.  While the burden falls on Kronos to 
show the need for an order, the EEOC’s legitimate purpose 
and interest in information-sharing cannot outweigh the 
tremendous harm to Kronos that could result from the 
disclosure of Kronos’s proprietary information.  The District 
Court thus did not abuse its discretion in entering a 
confidentiality order. 
 
B. 
 
While some form of a confidentiality order may be 
warranted, however, we must still consider whether the scope 
of the confidentiality provisions issued by the District Court 
were proper.  We first examine the EEOC’s objection to ¶ 8.  
 
This paragraph essentially requires the EEOC to 
provide notice of any FOIA requests to Kronos, refuse to 
disclose information in a FOIA request if Kronos objects, and 
allow Kronos to intervene in any suit in which a party seeks 
to obtain confidential information from the EEOC.  The 
EEOC argues that the requirements set forth in ¶ 8 conflict 
with its FOIA policies in four material ways:  (1) the EEOC 
must notify Kronos of any FOIA request made during the 
pendency of the Sandy charge, rather than remaining silent 
and routinely denying all such requests pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1610.19(g); (2) the EEOC must notify Kronos of a FOIA 
request made after closure of the Sandy charge within five 
business days, rather than having no time constraint for 
providing such notice; (3) the EEOC must not disclose the 
Confidential Information if Kronos objects to such disclosure, 
whereas its own policies require the EEOC to make an 
independent determination of whether Kronos raised a valid 
objection to disclosure pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1610.19(e)(1), 
and any disagreement with the EEOC’s decision to disclose 
would require the objector to seek an injunction to prevent 
disclosure; and (4) the EEOC must not object to Kronos’s 
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intervention if sued by a party under FOIA, whereas the 
EEOC would normally be able to object. 
 
   As the EEOC points out, entry of ¶ 8 appears to 
reflect a presumption that all of the so-called “Confidential 
Information” produced by Kronos constitutes trade secrets or 
commercial information that is entitled to remain 
confidential.  It is important to note that the District Court 
defined “Confidential Information” as “any documents or 
information derived from documents produced pursuant to” 
its order enforcing the subpoena.  App. 48.  This broad 
definition raises the possibility that the confidentiality order 
would encompass data in which neither Kronos, nor its 
customers and their respective job applicants, have any 
privacy interest — for example, data that Kronos has already 
publicly disclosed.  Given that neither we nor the District 
Court are privy to the information Kronos will disclose under 
the subpoena, we have no basis for concluding that all the 
subpoenaed information is protected.  
 
This is significant in light of our precedent regarding 
the purposes of FOIA and how requests for information 
should operate.  Congress enacted FOIA in 1966 to promote 
greater public disclosure of documents in the Government’s 
possession.  OSHA Data / CIH, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
220 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000).  Because Congress sought 
to promulgate “a general philosophy of full agency disclosure 
unless information is exempted under clearly delineated 
statutory language,” an agency bears the burden of proving 
that one of the nine statutory exceptions applies.  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted).  A document may not be 
exempted from disclosure under FOIA simply because some 
of its contents may be exempted; instead, “[w]e would have 
to be convinced that every ‘reasonably segregable portion’ of 
each document contains protected information.”  AT&T v. 
FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 499 n.8 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)), rev’d on other grounds
 
, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011).   
Allowing Kronos to assert unilaterally that any 
information it discloses to the EEOC is automatically exempt 
under FOIA precludes EEOC officials from performing the 
analysis required by FOIA after a request for information is 
made.  It is likely that much of the data disclosed by Kronos 
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will indeed be exempt under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), which 
allows nondisclosure of “trade secrets and commercial or 
financial information obtained from a person and privileged 
or confidential.”  Nonetheless, the District Court erred by 
impeding the EEOC’s ability to do its required analysis when 
faced with a FOIA request.   
 
On remand, we will instruct the District Court to 
remove ¶ 8 of its March 21, 2011 order.  However, we do not 
wish to foreclose the possibility that the District Court may 
exercise its discretion to redraft this provision to tailor it more 
narrowly.  If the District Court elects to do so, the court shall 
specifically consider how the Pansy
 
 factors relate to these 
specific limitations on disclosure.  We also ask that the 
District Court limit any such provision to information that 
must remain confidential to protect Kronos’s business 
interests, such as trade secrets, commercial information, and 
financial data. 
C. 
The EEOC also argues the District Court erred by 
limiting its use of the Kronos data to the Sandy charge (¶ 6) 
and precluding the EEOC from using “personal information 
regarding any Kroger employee, applicant, and/or test taker 
without prior permission of [the] Court” (¶ 9).  App. 45.  
According to the EEOC, the court’s power to enforce a 
subpoena and to enter an appropriate confidentiality order 
“does not mean the court may require the [EEOC] to pre-clear 
how it uses the subpoenaed information” during the course of 
its investigation.  EEOC Br. 48.   
 
In support of its argument that it has authority to use 
subpoenaed information for multiple charges involving 
employers other than Kroger, the EEOC cites EEOC v. 
Associated Dry Goods, 449 U.S. 590 (1981).  There, the 
Supreme Court held that the EEOC may place relevant 
information in multiple charge files involving the same 
employer.  Although it recognizes this distinction, the EEOC 
argues that we should extend this rule to situations where, as 
here, the EEOC might potentially use Kronos’s information in 
multiple charge files against multiple employers.  Kronos 
responds that the EEOC failed to explain how its 
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investigation would be affected by this restriction and that 
there is no legal basis for the EEOC’s assertion that it should 
have unlimited right to use the subpoenaed information in its 
investigations of other charges.  
 
Although Associated Dry Goods does not provide a 
resolution to this dispute, our opinion in Kronos I 
foreshadows why the District Court’s limitations regarding 
the use of the data are problematic.  We explained there that 
“[o]nce the EEOC begins an investigation, it is not required to 
ignore facts that support additional claims of discrimination if 
it uncovers such evidence during the course of a reasonable 
investigation of the charge.”  620 F.3d at 297.  The District 
Court’s order effectively impedes the EEOC’s ability to 
pursue any such leads by denying the EEOC the ability to use 
the data provided by Kronos.  This language may have been 
included due to the District Court’s concern that the EEOC 
would use its subpoena as a “fishing expedition” into other 
employers’ use of employment tests and into other forms of 
discrimination by both Kroger and other employers in 
violation of our opinion in Kronos I
 
.  Nonetheless, once we 
have decided the documents sought are relevant to the charge 
of discrimination, any other improper behavior discovered 
during the course of the EEOC’s investigation may be 
pursued.  Accordingly, the District Court’s limitations on the 
EEOC’s use of subpoenaed information is improper.  We will 
remand with instructions to the District Court to strike the 
language contained in ¶¶ 6 and 9. 
V. 
 
The EEOC also asserts the District Court erred by 
requiring it to reimburse Kronos for half of the cost of 
producing the subpoenaed information. 
 
A. 
 
The EEOC first argues the District Court should not 
have considered Kronos’s request for the EEOC to cover the 
costs of compliance with the subpoena because Kronos 
waived this argument by failing to raise the claim during the 
first appeal.  Specifically, the EEOC argues that the cost-
shifting issue “obviously overlap[s] considerably” with the 
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“undue burden” standard that is part of the fifth element in the 
test to enforce an administrative subpoena.  EEOC Br. 53.  
Kronos did not raise an undue burden argument during the 
initial proceedings before the District Court, which, according 
to the EEOC, is tantamount to a failure to object to paying the 
full cost of compliance with the subpoena.  Conversely, 
Kronos contends that its initial objection to the subpoena 
raised the issue of cost by arguing that “‘[c]ompliance . . . 
would require Kronos to expend very substantial resources, 
time, and money.’”  Kronos Br. 53 (quoting App. 178).  It 
then “suspended” the issue after the District Court 
significantly narrowed the scope of the subpoena in its order 
of June 1, 2009.  Id.  The issue did not resurface until after 
our decision in Kronos I — which expanded the scope of 
discoverable material and therefore increased the cost of 
compliance with the subpoena — at which time Kronos 
promptly raised it.  Kronos also correctly states that, as the 
appellees in Kronos I, “they were not required to raise all 
possible alternative grounds for affirmance to avoid waiving 
those grounds.”  Eichorn v. AT&T Corp.
 
, 484 F.3d 644, 657–
58 (3d Cir. 2007). 
“It is well established that arguments not raised before 
the District Court are waived on appeal.”  DIRECTV Inc. v. 
Seijas, 508 F.3d 123, 125 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007).  However, when 
a case is remanded, a district court “may consider, as a matter 
of first impression, those issues not expressly or implicitly 
disposed of by the appellate decision.”  Bankers Trust, 761 
F.2d at 950.  We have thus explained that a district court “is 
thereby free to make any order or direction in further progress 
of the case, not inconsistent with the decision of the appellate 
court, as to any question not settled by the decision.”  
 
Id. 
Our opinion in Kronos I did not discuss who should 
bear the costs of compliance with the EEOC’s subpoena, 
leaving the District Court free to consider the issue.   
Moreover, Kronos’s position on remand was significantly 
altered by our opinion in Kronos I because our opinion 
broadened the scope of the document production and thus 
likely increased Kronos’s cost of production.  Kronos was 
entitled to renew its objection to the new, higher cost of 
preparing discoverable materials.  We therefore hold that 
Kronos did not waive this issue. 
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B. 
 
 The EEOC also objects to the merits of the District 
Court’s decision that the costs of compliance should be split 
evenly between it and Kronos. 
 
The District Court based its decision on United States 
v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928, 936 (3d Cir. 1976), which 
involved the Government’s attempt to enforce summonses 
against several third-party banks and an accountant in the 
context of a tax liability investigation.  We recognized that no 
statutory authority exists to compel shifting the costs of 
compliance with an administrative subpoena.  Even so, we 
held that courts have the power to award costs when deciding 
to enforce a subpoena.  Id.  We went on to consider Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 45, which in its current iteration may 
require compensation for non-parties subject to civil 
subpoenas.  We noted that Rule 45 does not apply to 
administrative subpoenas, but nonetheless found the text of 
the rule, when coupled with Congress’s decision to entrust 
courts with the enforcement of administrative subpoenas, to 
be a useful indicator of “a broad congressional judgment with 
respect to fairness in subpoena enforcement proceedings.”  
Friedman, 532 F.2d at 937.  We further required that courts 
engage in an “individualized consideration rather than 
generalization” in determining how to award costs, holding 
that it was improper for the district court there to set a general 
rule requiring reimbursement for all of the banks involved in 
the case instead of considering each bank separately.  Id.  
Such an analysis was necessary, we held, in order to decide 
whether “the cost involved in complying with the summons in 
question exceed[ed] that which the respondent may 
reasonably be expected to bear as a cost of doing business.”  
Id. at 938.13
 
 
                                              
13 Friedman is the leading authority in this Circuit.  Although 
the EEOC cites EEOC v. Maryland Cup Corp., 785 F.2d 471 
(4th Cir. 1986), for the proposition that there is no statutory 
right to reimbursement, that case involved a subpoena issued 
to a party and, in any event, cannot supersede the law of this 
Court. 
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Following briefing by both parties, the District Court 
ordered that requiring each party to pay 50% of the costs 
would properly “strike a balance between the EEOC’s need 
for the information, and the financial burden on Kronos.”  
App. 53.  The court appeared to be particularly concerned 
about imposing the full cost of such a large production on a 
non-party.  App. 52.  It is unclear from the record exactly 
what evidence was before the court to prove that the costs of 
compliance would total $75,000, as the court mentioned only 
the existence of a one-page joint status report.  The sole piece 
of evidence in the record related to costs is the Kuhn 
affidavit, which was prepared in response to the more 
expansive Subpoena 2, and thus estimated the cost of 
compliance to fall between $656,184 and $1,161,119.14
 
  App. 
87, 91.   
We do not dispute that a cost-sharing order is within 
the District Court’s discretion, and we recognize that the 
estimate of $75,000 will likely increase when this case returns 
to the District Court.  Because the District Court will 
therefore again be tasked with determining how to allocate 
costs here, we note a few principles that should apply under 
such circumstances. 
 
As we stated in Friedman, the primary consideration in 
fairly allocating the cost of compliance with an administrative 
subpoena is whether the cost of compliance with the 
subpoena “exceed[ed] that which the respondent may 
reasonably be expected to bear as a cost of doing business.”  
532 F.2d at 938.  Such an inquiry requires at least some 
evidence to support a party’s assertion about what the actual 
costs of compliance will be.  Id.
                                              
14 The reduction of Kronos’s estimate of compliance to 
$75,000 was likely the result of the new limitations added by 
the District Court on remand.   
 at 937 (noting that a party 
who seeks reimbursement should be “required to produce 
evidence of the expense likely to be incurred in compliance 
with the summons”).  We also adopt the general proposition 
that a non-party should not be expected to bear as great an 
expense as a party when complying with a subpoena, a 
principle which finds support in the fact that Rule 45 
distinguishes between reimbursement for parties and non-
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parties.  See
 
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(B)(ii) (providing that a 
district court “must protect a person who is neither a party nor 
a party’s officer from significant expense resulting from 
compliance” with a subpoena).   
With these rules in mind, we will remand for the 
District Court to reconsider how the costs of production 
should be allocated in this matter. 
 
VI. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the 
judgment of the District Court.  We will remand for 
additional proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
